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Abstract
Through structured interviews and a literature review, we as-
sess which approaches to protection against insider thefts in the 
casino and pharmaceutical industries could be usefully applied 
to strengthen protections against insider theft in the nuclear in-
dustry, where insider thefts could have very high consequences. 
Among other measures, we suggest consideration of constant 
video surveillance of all vaults and insider-material interactions; 
frequent and rigorous material accounting; requiring everyone 
who touches material to sign for it; implementing an expanded 
two-person rule; rewarding attention to security; and establishing 
incident databases and experience sharing. While many of these 
measures are in place for some operations with weapons-usable 
material in some countries, they should be considered for more 
universal application.
Introduction
At the Washington nuclear security summit in April 2010, leaders 
from some forty-seven countries afﬁ  rmed that “nuclear terrorism 
is one of the most challenging threats to international security, 
and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means 
to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from 
acquiring nuclear materials.”1 The leaders reafﬁ  rmed their com-
mitment to take action to improve nuclear security at the Seoul 
nuclear security summit in March 2012.2
Nearly all of the documented thefts of highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU) or separated plutonium—the two materials that 
could be used to make a nuclear bomb—appear to have been 
perpetrated by insiders. Protection against insider threats, there-
fore, is an absolutely critical element of keeping the essential in-
gredients of nuclear bombs out of terrorist and criminal hands. 
Insiders, with their authorized access to sensitive areas and mate-
rials, their knowledge of the nuclear security system and its weak-
nesses, and their relations with other staff, pose major challenges 
for security planners.
To address this threat, a broad range of insider protection 
measures are required in national regulations and recommended 
in international guidelines for handling weapons-usable nuclear 
material (and, often, for operations in vital areas of nuclear facili-
ties as well), including checks to ensure insiders are trustworthy 
before granting access; two-person or three-person rule, so that 
no one is alone with weapons-usable nuclear material; continu-
ous surveillance of material operations; searches on entering and 
leaving key areas; accounting sufﬁ  ciently accurate to detect either 
abrupt or protracted thefts; use of uniquely identiﬁ  able and difﬁ  -
cult-to-defeat tamper-indicating devices; and storage of material 
in secure vaults or vault-type rooms when not in use.3 A number 
of useful sets of recommendations for protecting against insider 
theft of nuclear material have been developed.4
Nevertheless, insider-threat protection practices in the nuclear 
industry vary widely, and are often focused on simply complying 
with national-level rules, rather than focusing on continuous per-
formance improvement. In this article, we explore practices for 
protecting against insider threats in two high-security industries 
with a proﬁ  t incentive to achieve excellence in preventing insider 
theft—casinos and controlled pharmaceutical production—and 
explore whether the nuclear industry can adapt practices from 
these industries.5
To perform our assessment, one of us carried out structured 
interviews with security managers for several casinos and pharma-
ceutical facilities producing drugs with high black-market value. 
The interviews were based on a consistent set of questions, for 
comparability from one interview to the next, but also ﬂ  exibly 
pursued issues as they arose in the discussions. Because of limita-
tions of time and resources, these interviews covered only a lim-
ited number of facilities, and covered only facilities located in the 
United States. All of the interviewees wished to remain anony-
mous, and to keep the facilities whose security they managed un-
named as well. We combined these interviews with a review of 
relevant literature on casino and pharmaceutical security;6 a re-
view of literature on nuclear industry practices to protect against 
insiders (such as the material already cited); and extensive discus-
sions with nuclear industry experts on insider protection by one 
of the authors over a period of several years. 
Our assessment is that both the casino and pharmaceuti-
cal industries have developed some valuable approaches that 
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the practices we consider are already in use for operations with 
weapons-usable materials in some countries, they should be con-
sidered for broader application. At the same time, the casino and 
pharmaceutical industries are different from the nuclear industry 
in some key respects. In particular, both industries accept that 
in some cases the expense of preventing small thefts may not be 
worth the cost of prevention—an attitude those handing weap-
ons-usable nuclear material cannot afford to adopt when it comes 
to kilogram quantities of weapons-usable material.
We proceed in several stages. First, we offer a framework for 
analyzing programs to protect against insider theft, dividing these 
into categories. Second, we describe the insider protections used 
in the casino and the pharmaceutical industries, using this frame-
work. Third, we offer recommendations for the nuclear industry, 
intended to supplement best-practice guidance documents that 
have already been developed, on which we also draw.
Insider Protection: A Framework for Analysis
All situations involving protection against potential insider 
threats involve some combination of managing the potential in-
siders and managing the items to be protected (which might be 
things that might be stolen, areas of a facility that might be sabo-
taged, people who might be attacked, or information that might 
be stolen, damaged, or misused).
For this analysis, which focuses on items or materials that 
might be stolen, we refer to the items to be protected as “criti-
cal material,” and we identify two kinds of information we refer 
to as “critical knowledge.” First-degree critical knowledge, such 
as vault combinations, is knowledge that provides a major step 
toward gaining direct access to critical material. Second-degree 
critical knowledge can be characterized as security-related knowl-
edge that conscientious employees should ideally bring to the at-
tention of management or of security personnel, but that, if it 
remains concealed or forgotten rather than reported, increases the 
ease of diversion.7 Examples of second-degree critical knowledge 
include the location of a blind spot in an area supposedly moni-
tored by a surveillance camera, or the insight that a colleague 
has been rendered a target for blackmail by ﬁ  nancial or personal 
difﬁ  culties.
Programs to protect against insider threats generally com-
bine elements addressing the following six questions, with vary-
ing degrees of emphasis:
1.  How are insiders screened and monitored to ensure they are 
trustworthy?
Most high-security organizations perform some form of 
background check before giving people access to items, areas, or 
information to be protected, or information about how these are 
secured. The thoroughness of such checks varies widely, ranging 
from a simple criminal background check (or less) to a full in-
vestigation, in which the person’s career, ﬁ  nancial status, men-
tal health, friends, and family are all considered. Some form of 
monitoring of authorized insiders may be continued after they 
are employed, to detect notable changes in behavior or circum-
stances that may bear on their propensity to become an insider. 
(Many accounts of insider cases note that they are often preceded 
by inappropriate behaviors noticed by coworkers.8) In many en-
vironments, for example, insiders must undergo new background 
checks every few years to maintain their clearance, and staff are 
encouraged to report any changes in their own circumstances or 
suspicions about others. Both initial background screening and 
ongoing monitoring of employee behavior raise issues of privacy 
and civil liberties, and how much intrusion employees agree to 
permit varies depending on whether they are joining, for exam-
ple, a highly secretive intelligence agency or a commercial com-
pany not dealing with anything relating to the national security. 
2.  How are staff trained and motivated to reduce their vulnerabil-
ity to becoming insiders and to convince them to watch for and 
report suspicious activities or security weaknesses?
Keeping up staff morale and motivation, and convincing 
them to be active participants in achieving good security, are criti-
cal elements of an effective program to protect against insiders. 
One obvious step is ensuring that staff are adequately paid, so 
that desperation and anger at the organization for undervaluing 
them do not add to the motivation for insider theft.9 Programs to 
make employees feel that they are well-treated and their concerns 
are addressed are also important, and need not be particularly 
expensive. Studies of insider theft and sabotage in non-nuclear in-
dustries regularly conclude that simple employee disgruntlement 
is a major contributing factor.9
Many organizations use training and incentives programs to 
convince employees to take security seriously, be on the lookout 
for insider dangers, and report any suspicious activity or security 
weaknesses requiring correction that they observe. Many organi-
zations also provide training to employees to recognize and coun-
ter efforts to recruit them for nefarious purposes (for example 
counter-intelligence brieﬁ  ngs that are often given to people with 
authorized access to secret information).
Particularly difﬁ  cult issues arise when authorized employees 
know they are about to lose their jobs, or have just left their jobs. 
At these moments, the organization’s ability to offer incentives 
and disincentives is much reduced and the employees’ loyalty to 
the organization may be minimal, yet their access to critical ma-
terials or knowledge that could facilitate a malevolent act may 
remain unchecked. Our interviews suggest that nsider programs 
often include steps for dealing with these kinds of situations, such 
as removing employees from the most sensitive forms of access 
once they are in the process of leaving the organization, chang-
ing keys, combinations, or passwords after an employee with ac-
cess to them has left, and making clear the penalties associated 
with providing key information to unauthorized individuals after 
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tivities continues for some time after access is terminated. The 
passports of Russian nuclear weapons designers, for example, are 
reportedly held in the safe of the site security ofﬁ  cer for ﬁ  ve years 
after their employment comes to an end.10
Figure 1 summarizes the different forms of monitoring, con-
trol, and incentives and disincentives that may be applied at each 
stage of the employee life-cycle. 
3.  How are the items to be protected controlled, monitored, and 
accounted for?
Methods to secure and control the protected items themselves 
vary widely, depending on the circumstances of particular 
industries and operations. At Fort Knox, at one extreme, gold 
bars virtually never leave hardened vaults, and virtually no 
one ever enters those vaults. At the other extreme, in a casino, 
money and chips that can be exchanged for money are constantly 
handled in large quantities by hundreds of people on the gaming 
ﬂ   oor. Virtually all high-security organizations, however, will 
have some element of security, monitoring, and accounting for 
the items, areas, or information they are trying to protect. 
In particular, monitoring measures such as security cameras 
can make it possible to detect thefts as they are occurring, and 
accurate accounting can make it possible to conﬁ  rm that nothing 
signiﬁ  cant is missing—or to identify when things do appear to be 
missing and further investigation is required.
Items likely to tempt thieves due to their high value, 
portability, and related characteristics often go through a regular 
cycle: storage in a secure vault when not in use, removal from 
the vault, processing and use on the equivalent of a “shop ﬂ  oor,” 
and return to the vault. See Figure 2. The interviews conducted 
for this paper focused closely on how security is managed for 
each of the steps in this cycle, and how employees are screened, 
monitored, and motivated.
4.  How are interactions between the insiders and the items to be 
protected limited and monitored?
Controlling who can have access to the critical material, un-
der what circumstances, is often among the most important ele-
ments of a program to protect against insider threats. In many 
organizations, for example, no one would be allowed to access the 
critical material without a clear job requirement to do so; protected 
items might be kept in a vault when not in use, with very few 
people having authorized access to the vault; a two-person rule 
might be in place, prohibiting anyone from being alone with the 
material; and security cameras might provide additional monitoring 
whenever items are accessed. 
5.  How are investigations done to ﬁ  nd insiders that may exist? 
Despite their best efforts, organizations sometimes ﬁ  nd they 
have a malevolent insider in their midst—a thief, a saboteur, an 
assassin, a spy. Sometimes only indirect evidence exists that hints 
at this possibility. Many high-security organizations have pro-
cesses for investigating the possibility of insiders in their midst. 
In some cases, this can be done discretely, with little disruption to 
the organization. There are other cases, however, where the hunt 
for an insider can lead to major impacts on morale, with everyone 
suspecting everyone else. 
6.  How are testing, assessment, and learning from experience done?
Security systems must be assessed to see how effective they are. 
Some organizations use a “red teaming” approach, in which small 
Figure 1. Forms of monitoring, control, and incentives
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groups are charged with examining the security measures in place 
and trying to conceive of ways to overcome them. Often particular 
elements of the system are subject to tests, such as how accurate the 
accounting of material is or whether an alarm sounds when mate-
rial is carried past certain detectors or a vault is opened without 
proper authorization. Mechanisms for learning from past experi-
ence of what does and does not work are also important.
Having laid out this framework, we will now discuss secu-
rity against insiders in the casino and pharmaceutical industries 
in the United States, examining how each of these six elements 
is implemented in these two industries, and how much reliance 
is placed on each. In each case, we will begin by describing the 
general environment in the industry in question, which can have 
a major bearing on protection against insider threats.
Protection Against Insider Theft in the 
Casino Industry
Environment, Operations, and Security Assumptions
The critical material in a casino is cash and chips. Chips are used at 
gaming tables, and patrons can exchange them for cash at cages lo-
cated throughout the gaming ﬂ  oor, or at the main cashier. Employees 
can only exchange chips they may receive as tips at the main cashier. 
When not in use at the cages or the main cashier, cash is stored in a 
secure vault, and counted in a special “count room,” which is a vault 
of its own. See Figure 3. The use of chips rather than cash is itself an 
anti-theft measure, as the chips have no inherent value and are less 
likely than cash to be targeted by casual thieves.11
In principle, the cash and chips in a casino are individual 
countable items, but they are so numerous as to make frequent 
item-by-item accounting difﬁ   cult. In this respect, a casino is 
somewhat analogous to a nuclear facility handling large numbers 
of small items, such as a facility assembling pellets or plates of nu-
clear material into fabricated fuel elements, where critical nuclear 
materials would be removed from a secure vault and accounted 
for before and after their use on the ﬂ  oor. 
Casinos are a customer-facing industry and cannot allow se-
curity measures to encroach on the customer experience. Thou-
sands of people enter and leave the casino every day carrying both 
chips and cash, and because the casinos seek to maintain a wel-
coming atmosphere for customers, the security personnel do not 
search or scan them.
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For gaming establishments, the motivation to ensure against 
the diversion of critical materials is purely ﬁ  nancial. Small-scale 
diversions are typically not considered worth the time, effort and 
money required to stop them. Gaming security managers reported 
that a cashier could probably skim “a few hundred dollars” a day 
without detection.
Our interviews indicate that security professionals in the 
gaming industry operate under two unique assumptions. First, 
they assume that some threat, internal or external, is always 
present. Second, casino security professionals assume that non-
security staff (dealers, waitresses, cashiers, and so on) are probably 
not trustworthy, and may well prove to be thieves. To paraphrase 
one interviewee, “If I never hired anyone with a questionable 
personal history, I’d have to turn down 90 percent of the job ap-
plicants in Vegas.”
The casino security managers who participated in our study 
indicated that regulations governing the casino industry typically 
require that the security operation be composed of two distinct 
and independent units. Security staff members are a visible 
presence on the ﬂ  oor. They are trained in customer relations as 
well as security procedures and are charged with maintaining the 
physical security of the casino. Surveillance team members sit in 
secluded rooms monitoring security camera feeds from through-
out the casino. Every table game is monitored from multiple 
angles to identify cheaters. Surveillance teams typically verify 
employee ID badges for access into secure areas, and monitor 
the vault interiors and doors, cages, and the “count room”—a 
separate vault where the money is counted. Cameras are carefully 
hidden so that patrons do not feel like they are being spied on. 
Employees, on the other hand, always know that “Big Brother” is 
watching. To address the possibility of the casino’s general man-
ager being involved in activities he or she might wish to cover up, 
the surveillance team reports to a distinct chain of command, not 
through the general manager.
Screening and Monitoring Staff
Most ﬂ  oor employees are hired at the entry level and are given 
little responsibility for or access to ﬁ  rst-degree critical knowledge. 
Nevertheless, employment applications include authorization to 
conduct a criminal background check and a credit check. Red 
ﬂ  ags would include major property crime or fraud arrests, gam-
bling addictions, or signiﬁ  cant debt (though two managers indi-
cated that the 2008 ﬁ  nancial meltdown has made bankruptcy too 
common to be considered a red ﬂ  ag). Security and surveillance 
personnel undergo more stringent background checks, though 
nothing like the screening required for a security clearance to 
handle weapons-usable nuclear material.
Casinos do not speciﬁ  cally monitor changes in employee be-
havior off the job after hiring (such as sudden and unexplained 
wealth). On the job, suspicious changes in behavior may show up 
in surveillance. One interviewee reported a case in which a cock-
tail waitress began spending inordinate amounts of time near one 
particular gaming table; the casino eventually discovered that she 
was colluding with a dealer to steal chips.
Casinos also maintain a list of “permanently ejected” in-
dividuals. The “permanently ejected” list includes patrons that 
are banned from the premises for reasons varying from drunken 
brawls to gambling addiction, as well as former employees ﬁ  red 
for misconduct or theft.  
Security personnel escort employees terminated for cause 
off the property, and their ID and access badges are conﬁ  scated. 
Door codes (where they are utilized) are immediately changed. 
One casino reported that all ex-employees are banned from the 
premises for ninety days, while another indicated that they allow 
former employees to return as patrons as long as they were not 
placed on the “permanently ejected” list. Every casino security 
manager interviewed indicated that the processes and security 
and surveillance systems already in place could be relied upon to 
stop an ex-employee from abusing critical knowledge.  
Training and Motivating Staff
Most new employees undergo approximately two days of orienta-
tion, primarily on casino operations. New hires are indoctrinated 
into the security operations speciﬁ  c to their own work. Security 
and surveillance personnel require more extensive training, which 
is also conducted on the job. Surveillance personnel are required 
to know how to play every table game, so that they can better 
detect cheats or card-readers, while security personnel are trained 
on how to conduct “chip counts,” escort critical gaming materials, 
and interact with patrons.
Security and surveillance personnel often undergo weekly 
or monthly security training. Generally, training appears to be 
focused on procedures and practices rather than “red team” ex-
ercises (that is, exercises in which mock adversaries attempt to 
defeat the security system and the security team has to ﬁ  nd ways 
to detect and respond to the attempt). In some instances, security 
training is just a part of a general training required by state regu-
lations, including everything from sexual harassment prevention 
to security procedures. General ﬂ  oor employees receive regular 
security training only if a promotion requires additional access to 
critical materials or knowledge.
Floor employees make a reasonable wage when salary and 
tips are included. Security and surveillance personnel receive 
higher salaries because they do not receive tips. According to one 
casino security manager, wages are neither a major source of loy-
alty to the establishment nor a major source of disgruntlement. 
All employees are aware that theft is an ever-present threat. 
Nevertheless, interviewees expressed the view that while security 
and surveillance staff were highly vigilant, general employees 
probably would not bother to report suspicious activity short 
of clear and overt misconduct. In some cases, the casinos pro-
vide training and other materials to emphasize to employees that 
threats to the casino’s well-being are also threats to their jobs. 
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security issues does not appear to be an area on which casinos 
place much emphasis. Multiple casino security managers, how-
ever, indicated that anonymous tip lines were one of their most 
productive security programs.
Controlling, Monitoring, and Accounting for Protected Items
Both a cashier and a security employee must agree to enter the 
vault where cash is secured. Cash and chip transfers between the 
vault and cages and between cages and tables require a security 
escort, dual concurrence, and signatures from both the deliverer 
and the receiver of the critical material, attesting to the accuracy 
of the count. At least every twenty-four hours, cash is collected 
from each cage and escorted to the count room. Dual concur-
rence is required to enter and exit the count room. To reduce the 
probability of collusion, a two-person team comprised of indi-
viduals from different organizations, typically a trained cashier 
and a Gaming Commission member, are present for the count. 
Surveillance cameras continuously monitor the interiors of and 
the entrances to the vault and the count room. 
Limiting and Monitoring Insider-Item Interactions
Access to the vault, cages, and count room is permitted only to speci-
ﬁ  ed individuals under precise circumstances. Staff can only exchange 
the chips they receive for tips at the main cashier, where cashing an 
unusually large quantity or denomination of chips, or cashing-out 
unusually frequently, would raise questions. Dealers tips (also chips, 
which they are not allowed to cash) are placed in a locked toke box, 
located at every table, then distributed among dealers at the end of 
the week, based on the number of hours worked. 
Uniforms for the ﬂ  oor staff are designed to discourage theft. 
Sleeves are typically elbow-length or shorter, and pockets are ei-
ther disallowed or covered with an apron.
Conducting Investigations
Interviewees did not provide a great deal of detail about the inves-
tigations they conduct when a staff member is suspected of theft. 
Often suspicions are raised from, and key evidence provided by, 
activities observed on surveillance cameras. 
Assessment, Testing, and Learning
Learning from collective experience, rather than formal testing 
and assessment, appears to be the mainstay of casino security 
operations. Casinos learn from problems they have encountered 
themselves, and also have a system for sharing information on 
threats. According to one source, a cheating ring was apprehended 
because casinos in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut shared 
information including suspect descriptions and modus operandi. 
The ﬁ  rst casinos hit were unable to stop the fraudsters, but were 
able to provide enough information to neighboring casinos that 
security and surveillance were able to identify and apprehend the 
offenders. Data sharing could provide similar results in cases of 
insider diversion schemes.
Potential Weak Points
Multiple security managers reported that dealers have been caught 
stealing chips, typically through sleight-of-hand. Dealers are pro-
hibited from cashing chips, but a dealer-thief could easily collude 
with a food and beverage employee or a patron, who could cash 
the stolen chip without suspicion. Every casino reported surveil-
lance as the primary method to detect and disrupt such a scheme. 
 Another potential vulnerability is cash-skimming from the 
vault, count room, or cage. One casino reported that cashiers 
who are either over or under on their cash-counts by a speciﬁ  ed 
amount during a rolling twelve-month period are terminated. 
While the exact amount of acceptable gain or loss was not dis-
closed, a cashier with this second-degree critical knowledge could 
carefully steal just below the line and avoid detection–just as 
some nuclear material thieves have done.12 
Finally, the standofﬁ  sh relationship between surveillance and 
general employees has both positive and negative implications for 
diversion prevention efforts. Assuming that most employees are 
less than trustworthy, gaming security and surveillance ofﬁ  cers 
are unlikely to suffer from the “halo effect,” in which well-liked 
employees are assumed to be trustworthy.13 
Constant awareness of being under surveillance and poten-
tial suspicion, however, is unlikely to generate feelings of loyalty 
or buy-in from most employees. Thus such approaches probably 
lower the threshold for individuals to cross over into illicit 
activity, and make employees less likely to report second-degree 
critical knowledge that could provide insight into potential secu-
rity threats. 
Protection Against Insider Theft in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Environment, Operations, and Security Assumptions
In this study, we focused on sites that produce and distribute a 
particular Schedule II narcotics (Schedule II are designated as 
controlled substances according to the U.S. Controlled Substance 
Act) that is subject to abuse and has a high street value. (Inter-
viewees asked us not to specify which one, as only a few facilities 
produce it, and they did not wish to reveal facility-speciﬁ  c se-
curity information.) In these facilities, the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (API) is stored in a secured vault until it is ready for 
use. It is then moved to the production area, where it is combined 
with inactive ingredients to make the ﬁ  nal dosage form (FDF), 
small pills in the case of the facilities we focused on. The pills are 
then packaged and sent out to distributors, leaving the control of 
the original facility that made them. See Figure 4. Like a nuclear 
bulk-processing facility, these sites are producing or fabricating 
large quantities of critical material in bulk, and have to ensure 
that accounting uncertainties that suggest an operational gain or 
loss are not masking diversion.
Only a small portion of the security incentive in the phar-
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that might be stolen; instead, companies want to avoid the brand 
impact of having their drugs driving black markets along with 
scrutiny (and potentially shutdown) from regulators. This means 
much lower tolerance for small-scale thefts. 
The potential for insider theft exists at every level of the 
pharmaceutical production and distribution chain. Individuals 
employed at production sites, distribution centers, and pharma-
cies are all potential insiders. This study is based on interviews 
with security managers for production and distribution sites, and 
did not explore security at pharmacies or transporters handling 
these materials.
At the pharmaceutical distribution sites, most employees are 
professionally licensed pharmacists and pharmacy technicians, 
bound by the ethical standards of the American Pharmacists As-
sociation (APA), and keenly aware that a breach would result in 
the loss of their licenses. Interviewees assumed that APA licensing 
was a major contribution to reducing insider risks among these 
personnel, though it is not clear that this conclusion is backed 
by data. The pharmaceutical distribution site whose staff we in-
terviewed did not differentiate between staff who did or did not 
handle controlled substances; but this facility trains surveillance 
cameras on every workstation at which controlled substances are 
handled. At production sites, staff are typically not licensed phar-
macists or pharmacy technicians, but pharmaceutical producers 
reported requiring additional training and screening for individu-
als assigned to handle controlled substances in the factories.
The security managers we interviewed indicated that their 
operations, unlike casinos, do not differentiate between security 
and surveillance operations. Security personnel report to an on-
site security manager, who in turn reports to the security manager 
at corporate headquarters. The site general manager is excluded 
from the security chain of command to maintain the objectiv-
ity and independence of the security operation. No regulations 
overtly restrict relationships between security and non-security 
staff, though according to one interviewee, they operate in “sepa-
rate circles” that naturally limit daily interactions.
In addition to the security team, controlled substance teams 
(CSTs), usually comprised of security, compliance, and law-
enforcement professionals, are assigned to every pharmaceutical 
production site handling Schedule II substances. Acting as some-
thing akin to an internal auditor, they are charged with ensur-
ing that the company complies with both the letter and spirit of 
relevant regulations. Like the security team, the CSTs report to 
corporate headquarters rather than to site managers. 
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Security managers for controlled pharmaceutical producers 
report expending a great deal of effort to ensure security buy-
in from corporate leadership on down. They attempt to ensure 
that every employee is aware of the harsh penalties for failing to 
comply with federal regulations. Simultaneously, pharmaceutical 
producers pride themselves as stewards of public health, and work 
to ensure that every employee shares that sense of responsibil-
ity. According to one interviewee, security has moved from being 
considered a “business disabler to a business enabler.”
Quality assurance (QA) plays a central role in pharmaceutical 
production, and it is used as an element of theft prevention as 
well. At production sites, manufactured pills are pulled at ran-
dom for QA checks. While these checks are primarily intended 
to ensure accurate formulation, they also provide a check against 
the diversion of API that would lead to detectable changes in 
pill formulation. At distribution sites, QA randomly selects ﬁ  lled 
prescriptions to check for the accuracy of pill-counts.
Producers and distributors of Schedule II substances are 
subject to several layers of regulation. The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) is the primary regulator concerned with 
theft of Schedule II pharmaceuticals. The DEA also regulates the 
design and construction of facilities producing or distributing 
controlled substances. The DEA approves blueprints for Sched-
ule II production facilities to ensure compliance with security 
requirements. Though not required, many companies seek DEA 
guidance in designing their security system. The DEA has the 
authority to inspect facilities on short notice and can shut down 
a facility that is found to be in violation of security procedures.
The Department of Health and Human Services enforces the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 
1996, which guarantees privacy and security standards for patient 
information. Pharmaceutical distributors in particular appear to 
consider HIPAA training a valuable part of their employee indoc-
trination, and count on it to increase general security awareness 
and buy-in, though it is not focused on protecting against theft. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is mainly 
concerned with quality assurance and regulatory compliance. 
The FDA would be the ﬁ  rst regulator notiﬁ  ed if QA detected 
an irregular formulation. Our interviewees indicated that most 
pharmaceutical distribution facility employees, and some staff at 
production sites, are licensed by the APA, and could lose their 
license if caught stealing or contributing to thefts by others.
Screening and Monitoring Staff
Pharmaceutical ﬁ   rms subject potential employees to ﬁ  nancial 
and criminal background checks. Red ﬂ   ags include criminal 
activity and a history of substance abuse. As in the gaming 
industry, pharmaceutical security managers indicated that the 
economic downturn has made bankruptcy or ﬁ  nancial hardship 
so commonplace that it is no longer a useful red ﬂ  ag. 
The pharmaceutical industry maintains a “disbanded list” 
of individuals banned from working with controlled substances, 
listing individuals ﬁ   red from producers or distributors under 
suspicion, people who had been convicted of possession or 
distribution of illegal drugs, and the like. 
Ex-employees are immediately denied access to facilities 
and their IT systems, no matter the reason for their departure. 
It is unlikely that an individual terminated for illicit activities 
would be hired by another pharmaceutical company, and the 
worst offenders would be placed on the national disbarred list to 
prevent them from falsifying employment records to conceal their 
past misdeeds. 
Training and Motivating Staff
Pharmaceutical companies give new employees site-speciﬁ  c 
security training as well as training required for HIPAA and 
other regulatory compliance. At pharmaceutical production 
sites, individuals selected to work with controlled substances are 
required to undergo additional training.
HIPAA requires annual refresher training, and most 
corporations conduct annual or quarterly security training as 
well. DEA and FDA audits and short-notice inspections help 
ensure that site managers and employees remain vigilant. 
One interviewee in particular emphasized that security 
vigilance is a by-product of a security-conscious corporate culture 
that recognizes theft prevention as an essential element of brand 
protection and operational success. 
Controlling, Monitoring, and Accounting for the 
Items to be Protected
When API is received at a production facility, workers measure 
its weight, and then subject it to a number of quality checks to 
ensure purity before clearing it for production. The two-person 
rule is in effect when workers open an API vault, remove a spe-
ciﬁ  c amount (by weight), secure the vault, and transport the API 
to the production line, where they conﬁ  rm its weight and purity 
once more. 
The production line is under constant camera surveillance, 
as are the inside and the outside of the vaults. The CST and se-
curity personnel also monitor the production lines. The factory 
produces pills in batches of modest size, making it possible for 
the accounting system to measure input and output, and localize 
any identiﬁ  ed losses, more precisely than would be plausible in a 
continuous process. 
QA tests pills from every production lot. If QA ﬁ  nds that the 
percentage of API is low in randomly selected pills, they would ﬁ  rst 
suspect and investigate the possibility of misformulation or inad-
equate mixing. If the reason for the low API percentage cannot be 
determined, then security is notiﬁ  ed to investigate the possibility of 
API diversion. If a machine jams and pills fall onto the ﬂ  oor, the line 
is halted and each pill is retrieved, accounted for, and destroyed.
The vast majority of pills are packaged in large-capacity 
bottles (commonly 100-pill for brand-name, 1,000-pill for ge-
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percentage of the pills destined for in-patient facilities are pack-
aged in blister packs. Both types of packaging include “tamper-
evident” seals. (Tests have suggested that thieves may be able to 
defeat many types of seals, however.14) 
Once the wholesaler takes custody of the FDF, the responsi-
bility for its security transfers from the manufacturer to the dis-
tributor. The wholesaler typically ships the product via regional 
distribution centers, and then on to pharmacies. Pills are repack-
aged into the appropriate pill-count bottle after each prescription 
is veriﬁ  ed. Distribution site QA randomly samples ﬁ  lled prescrip-
tions to ensure that they include the correct number of pills. 
One pharmaceutical distribution site security manager ex-
plained that bottles of pills are purchased by weight, not pill 
count. To ensure that they never fall below their contractually 
required weight, it is not uncommon for manufacturers (particu-
larly of generic pharmaceuticals, including generic narcotics) to 
overﬁ  ll bottles, including 1,005 pills or so in a 1,000-pill bottle. 
If a prescription bottle comes up short, this “gain” is used to offset 
it at no additional cost. One interviewee acknowledged that such 
errors “did happen,” given “the [tens of thousands] of prescrip-
tions we ﬁ  lled each day.”
Limiting and Monitoring Insider-Item Interactions
Vaults for controlled substances and their active ingredients are 
under constant camera surveillance. Only speciﬁ  ed personnel can 
access the vaults, and only with two people acting together. The 
workers measure the material both when it leaves the vault and 
when it arrives in the production area. The production area is 
under surveillance by security cameras and watched by security 
and by the CST.
At distribution sites, some prescriptions are ﬁ  lled by ma-
chine; licensed pharmacists and pharmacy technicians ﬁ  ll the 
remainder by hand. A limited number of individuals handle 
controlled substances, and security cameras are trained on them 
to detect any attempt to divert critical pharmaceutical materials. 
Like the casino industry, both pharmaceutical producers and dis-
tributors require pocketless uniforms to discourage casual theft. 
Conducting Investigations
Here, too, interviewees did not provide substantial detail on 
how their companies conduct investigations when they suspect 
employees of theft. As with casinos, evidence from surveillance 
cameras plays a major role in raising initial suspicions and pro-
viding evidence. Overall, it does not appear that investigations 
themselves are a major element of the insider protections at phar-
maceutical facilities. 
Assessment, Testing, and Learning
Pharmaceutical security managers reported conducting red-team 
exercises in which participants brainstorm diversion scenarios 
and security personnel simulate countering them. These exercises 
help identify potential vulnerabilities and stimulate vigilance. 
Learning from and sharing experience are also critical ele-
ments of pharmaceutical security programs. The Pharmaceutical 
Security Institute (PSI) maintains a database of pharmaceutical-
related incidents. Data are collected on a voluntary basis, but, ac-
cording to multiple interviewees, the database is comprehensive. 
A security manager contacts the PSI to report an incident; if the 
PSI has similar incidents in their database, they will put the se-
curity managers from both victim-companies in touch with each 
other. Contact is voluntary, but security managers report enthusi-
astically following through to learn from each other’s experiences. 
(Since brand protection is a key goal, PSI covers both counterfeit-
ing and thefts of controlled substances, with its main emphasis on 
counterfeiting. In the case of thefts, the incident database focuses 
on very large incidents, valued at $100,000 or more.15) 
In addition to the PSI database, one manufacturing ﬁ  rm re-
ported a more informal supply-chain security database focusing 
on cargo theft, maintained by their security staff. Now collect-
ing data from multiple companies as well as state and local law 
enforcement ofﬁ  cials, this unofﬁ  cial consortium provides a “safe 
space” for security professionals to discuss challenges they face, 
exchange data, and discuss legislation that impacts their efforts. 
Potential Weak Points
The pharmaceutical security system also has potential weakness-
es. Resourceful thieves could defeat the seals on bottles and blis-
ter packs to remove pills without detection. The extra pills pack-
aged to ensure compliance with contracted weight requirements 
appear ripe for diversion. No standard exists for the number of 
“extra” pills per bottle, and pharmaceutical distribution sites con-
sider this gain a windfall rather than an accounting concern. 
The pharmaceutical industry may also be in danger of falling 
victim to the halo effect. Every interviewee emphasized that their 
employees were licensed professionals, held accountable to the APA 
code of ethics—yet it is not obvious that this substantially reduces 
the risk that these individuals will participate in insider theft. Doc-
tors and nurses who steal medications face similar professional 
penalties, yet such theft remains an ongoing problem. There is a 
danger that this belief in the honesty of licensed professionals may 
lull security professionals into overlooking suspicious acts.
There is also the possibility of surreptitious theft while insid-
ers are handling the drugs. Casino dealers manage to palm chips 
despite sleeveless uniforms and multiple security cameras; pharma-
ceutical workers may be able to do the same, with far smaller pills.
Pharmacies themselves represent another potential weak point 
in the system. Several interviewees argued that theft of Schedule II 
pharmaceuticals is most likely to occur at individual pharmacies. 
Burglaries targeting controlled substances are not uncommon, and 
fraudulent prescriptions are a major concern. Indeed, some phar-
macies have given up carrying drugs in particular demand among 
violent thieves. See Figure 5. The extent to which insiders are in-
volved in these thefts cannot be determined without access to arrest 
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Recommendations for the Nuclear Industry
The casino and pharmaceutical industries, of course, are not the 
same as the nuclear industry. In particular, both can afford to 
take the attitude that small thefts may not be cost-effective to 
prevent. Moreover, every facility is unique and must implement 
insider protections best suited to its particular circumstances 
and processes.
Nevertheless, this analysis of insider protection in the casino 
and security industries suggests some approaches to insider pro-
tection that the nuclear industry should consider.
Constant video surveillance of both vaults and all insider-
material interactions. Both the casino and the pharmaceutical 
industries use security cameras to monitor critical material in-
side vaults as well as the vault door.  Both use constant video 
surveillance when insiders are handling critical material. While 
it may seem redundant to monitor both the vault interior and 
door, there have been a number of major thefts in other indus-
tries that involved people gaining access to the inside of the vault 
by unorthodox means—such as tunneling in from underneath—
and surveillance inside vaults would help deter insiders with 
legitimate access from palming critical material from the vault. 
Similarly, constant video surveillance may seem redundant with 
two-person rule, but provides an additional layer of detection and 
therefore of deterrence of insider theft. 
Frequent and rigorous material accounting. Casinos de-
vote a special vault to counting their cash, and require a rigorous 
two-person count at the end of every shift. The pharmaceutical 
industry requires rigorous accounting of input materials and 
product, in batches small enough that uncertainties could not 
cover a major theft. Nuclear facilities handling weapons-usable 
nuclear material in bulk forms also typically require detailed ac-
counting for the material, but opportunities for more frequent 
and localized accounting may exist that would not substantially 
increase costs.
Requiring everyone who touches critical material to sign 
for it. The gaming industry’s practice of requiring every indi-
vidual who touches cash or chips to sign their name and vouch 
for count accuracy could also be used more widely at nuclear 
facilities. Though a determined thief will likely be undeterred, 
this simple and inexpensive process could provide three distinct 
beneﬁ  ts: 
•  Increasing security awareness and personal responsibility (“I 
signed for it, I better make sure it is properly accounted for”).
•  Providing a record of critical material movement. This “pa-
per trail” could provide an investigative starting point should 
critical material go missing.
•  Offering insight into irregular employee activities (repeat-
edly forgetting to sign for critical material or falsifying or 
tampering with the signature card would call for further 
scrutiny). 
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Implementing an expanded two-person rule. Both gaming 
and pharmaceutical security operations expand on the two-person 
rule by requiring that the two individuals be from different depart-
ments. Individuals who report to different chains of command and 
who do not regularly interact are less likely to form the kind of trust 
required for successful collusion, or suffer the same disgruntlement 
to motivate theft. Some nuclear facilities follow similar practices: to 
open the warhead storage bunkers at the Pantex plant near Ama-
rillo, Texas, requires lifting off a multi-ton block from the door 
using a specialized forklift, and then opening two locks, the key to 
one of which is held by the operations staff, the other by security 
(personal observation, 1995). This simple practice could be incor-
porated more widely at nuclear facilities. 
Rewarding attention to security. One step every organiza-
tion should take is to consciously reward, rather than marginalize, 
employees who point out security vulnerabilities and options for 
improvement.16 At the very least, an anonymous tip-line should 
be installed (and its contents acted upon) to remove the fear of 
reprisal as a barrier to reporting concerns and to convince 
employees that concerns will be addressed.  
Seeking widespread buy-in to the importance of security. 
A number of pharmaceutical security managers explained that 
they strive for security buy-in by emphasizing corporate commit-
ment to being a steward of public health, and that good secu-
rity protects the work and livelihoods of every employee. While 
buy-in may take years to achieve in full, similar tacks simultane-
ously appealing to emotion (patriotism, or the desire to prevent a 
nuclear disaster) and pragmatism (security is here to protect my 
work) may be fruitful. 
Splitting security and surveillance. This practice has both 
advantages and disadvantages, which may explain why casinos 
have adopted it and pharmaceutical plants have not. Surveillance 
teams independent of security could make it more difﬁ  cult for a 
security ofﬁ  cer and a technician with access to material to col-
lude to steal material. Moreover, surveillance ofﬁ  cers are prob-
ably better able to monitor the activities of all facility employees 
objectively, avoiding the halo effect. On the other hand, with 
only the information available from security cameras and alarm 
systems, they may not be privy to information about particular 
people that might help them interpret what they are seeing.
The educated professionals employed at nuclear facilities 
may resist the Big-Brother-is-watching atmosphere that exists at 
most casinos. Security ofﬁ  cers, therefore, should be the trusted 
and approachable face of security, while the surveillance team re-
mains largely unseen. 
Involving regulators in design. One pharmaceutical pro-
ducer described DEA involvement “at the blue-print stage” of 
facility design, reviewing approaches and making suggestions. In 
the nuclear industry as well, it might be worthwhile to involve 
regulators and security experts from the earliest stages of design, 
to help achieve a “security by design” approach in which cost-
effective security measures are designed in from the outset. 
Establishing threat databases and experience sharing. As 
discussed above, the PSI maintains a database of all pharmaceuti-
cal-related crimes. Similarly, the casino industry shares informa-
tion on crimes and criminals their businesses confront; as one 
example, commercial ﬁ  rms are in the business of providing soft-
ware that allows the casinos to easily put photos and names of 
card counters, thieves, and others excluded from their casinos in a 
shared database. (There are several such ﬁ  rms; one of the leading 
companies is Biometrica Systems.17) Outside researchers have also 
developed extensive databases on insider cyber incidents related 
to critical infrastructure.8
Properly administered, similar databases could provide a 
wide range of beneﬁ  ts to nuclear security operations. Such an ef-
fort might include both databases for particular countries admin-
istered by national institutions (such as the National Nuclear Se-
curity Administration in the United States) and databases serving 
the broader international community, perhaps administered by 
an organization such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security. 
These databases should include speciﬁ   cs of real cases of 
nuclear material theft (modus operandi, responsible parties, etc.) 
and near-misses that did not culminate in the actual loss of ma-
terial. It would also be worthwhile to include selected incidents 
at non-nuclear facilities that may help inform nuclear security 
managers about adversary capabilities and tactics to be protected 
against.18 This could include, for example, cases of multiple in-
siders conspiring together to steal money or other valuable items; 
cases where outsiders and inﬁ  ltrated insiders worked together to 
defeat elaborate security systems such as the remarkable Antwerp 
Diamond Center heist in 200319); and more.20 Ideally, the insti-
tution managing the database should employ professionals to reg-
ularly analyze it for trends, lessons learned, and potential threats.
To maximize effectiveness, the database should not be over-
classiﬁ  ed, and should be widely available among nuclear security 
professionals and site managers. If parts of the database required 
higher classiﬁ  cation, they could be separated from the rest. 
Potential beneﬁ  ts of national and ultimately international 
databases of this kind include: 
￿ Increasing  vigilance. One of the reasons to make such data-
bases widely available to nuclear security managers is to help 
increase vigilance and threat awareness. The attitude that “it 
will never happen here” is more easily overcome when one 
can point to numerous recorded incidents in which it did, or 
almost did.
￿  Connecting the dots on threat information. Adversaries car-
rying out surveillance on one facility may be watching other 
facilities as well—and the nature of the activity may become 
clear if these facilities are exchanging information. An em-
ployee report of being approached by a suspiciously curious 
stranger might be overlooked at one facility, but might pro-
voke increased scrutiny if observed at multiple facilities. 
￿  Sharing best practices, jointly developing solutions. The 
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managers who have experienced similar incidents to contact 
each other. Interviewees indicated that the additional trans-
portation security database discussed earlier also provides a 
forum for discussion of real incidents and potential responses. 
￿  Improving responsiveness to emerging issues. Data might 
include premature failures or unexpected weaknesses in secu-
rity technologies, issues with new procedures, and the like. 
With these data from other facilities in hand, security manag-
ers would be better able to foresee vulnerabilities and allocate 
budgets, allowing security to move from reactive response to 
incidents to proactive anticipation of vulnerabilities.
￿  Strengthening employee buy-in. Individual facilities might 
encourage employees to review information from the data-
base and help prepare their own site’s data for contribution, 
helping them to understand the reality of the threat and to 
be on the lookout for relevant information. 
In the world of nuclear safety, sharing of operating experi-
ence, including incidents that could have a safety implication 
(such as clogged pumps or cracked equipment) has been an ab-
solutely central element of the dramatic increase in nuclear safety 
achieved in the decades since Three Mile Island. In the United 
States, each reactor is a member of the Institute for Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO, the U.S. arm of the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators, or WANO), and is required to provide re-
ports on each safety-related incident, with an analysis of root 
causes and lessons learned. INPO analyzes these reports, and dis-
tributes lessons learned bulletins to all operating U.S. reactors. 
Moreover, INPO reviews and rates each facility’s implementation 
of these lessons learned.21 No comparable process exists in nuclear 
security, either at the national or the international level.
The use of some or all of these practices from the casino and 
pharmaceutical industries may help the nuclear industry reduce 
the risks of insider theft. But there is no magic bullet. Insiders, 
with their authorized access to facilities and knowledge of the 
facility security system (and, potentially, its vulnerabilities) will 
remain a signiﬁ  cant challenge for nuclear security. Finding ways 
to keep employees motivated and loyal, to build strong security 
cultures with widespread employee buy-in to the need for strin-
gent security, and to give employees incentives to identify and re-
solve potential vulnerabilities, will remain difﬁ  cult management 
problems. Difﬁ  cult challenges also arise in striking an appropriate 
balance between respecting employees and remaining aware of 
the danger that any insider could commit criminal acts. Constant 
vigilance and an approach focused on continual adaptation and 
improvement will remain necessary. 
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